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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MILDRED RHOADES individually and as 
Administratrix of the Estate of Claude 
Rhoades, deceased, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
JAMES C. WRIGHT, also known as JAMES 
CLIFFORD WRIGHT, and CLIFFORD WRIGHT 
and ESSIE WRIGHT, his wife, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 14159 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action to recover for the wrongful death of 
Claude Rhoades. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted Defendants1 motion to quash 
service of process, held that attachment is an improper method 
to confer jurisdiction in a v/rongful death case where the tort 
sued upon arose in another state and pursuant to this holding 
granted Defendants1 ex parte motion to vacate the writ of 
attachment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks to have the decision of the 
lower court reversed, the writ of attachment reinstated and 
the case remanded for a trial on the merits. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS : -
The following facts, in addition to those already 
contained in Plaintiff-Appellant's first brief on file herein 
and in addition to Defendants-Respondents1 statement of the 
facts, appear pertinent to the matter before the Court. 
Defendants have objected to Plaintiff's statement of 
the facts as reciting information not introduced into evidence; 
however, the facts Defendants find objectionable are taken 
from the statement of facts in the decision of the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals where that court considered whether 
the federal district court had in personam jurisdiction based 
on the Long Arm Statute or in rem jurisdiction based on the 
unamended Rule 64C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. A 
printed copy of that decision was filed in the San Juan 
District Court by Defendants themselves and is included in 
the Record on Appeal at page 43. While the action in federal 
court was not identical to the present action insofar as the 
question of jurisdiction is concerned, it was based on the 
same incident or occurrence. ,--
Since this Court is now called upon to consider the 
validity and bases of in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction, 
an understanding of the background and the facts alleged, 
some of which are admittedly disputed, is essential to 
determine whether error was committed by the court below when 
it vacated the writ of attachment and ruled that attachment 
based on the amended Rule 64C was not a proper means of 
<A 
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acquiring in rem jurisdiction. 
No hearing has been held on the merits of the case 
and no evidence received by the court below; consequently, 
Plaintiff is limited in her statement of the facts to the 
record now before the Court, 
In addition to the foregoing facts, Plaintiff-Appellant 
further supplements her statement with the following facts 
pertaining to due process. 
Before any writ of attachment issued in this case, 
Defendants had already appeared specially on January 2, 1975 
(R.6) and again on April 22, 1975 (R.9) and filed their 
motions to quash service of process. On May 1, 1975, before 
any v/rit of attachment had issued, Defendants had filed their 
notice of hearing (R.10) and memorandum of authorities (R.13-
29) wherein, in apparent anticipation that a writ of attach-
ment would be issued, they argued that attachment is an 
improper means of conferring in rem jurisdiction. (R.22-26) 
The writ of attachment in this case was not issued 
until May 12, 19 75, two days before the hearing which had 
been noticed up by Defendants wherein oral arguments and 
memoranda of authorities were submitted to the court on the 
issues, including the issue of in rem jurisdiction based on 
attachment. Although the writ of attachment was not included 
in the Record on Appeal when it was transmitted to this Court, 
the San Juan County Court docket reflects that it was issued 
on May 12, 1975, and Plaintiff is prepared to produce the 
3 
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i 
original writ issued by the clerk and dated May 12, 1975. 4 
The affidavit for attachment dated May 12, 1975, is found on
 ( 
pages 56 and 57 of the Record. 
Thereafter the court granted Defendants1 motion to 
quash, held that attachment is an improper method to confer 
jurisdiction and subsequently vacated Plaintiff's writ of 
attachment (R.64-65), hence this appeal. 
ISSUES 
1. The prior decision in the federal court is not 
res judicata as to jurisdiction. ;...^..a 
2. Plaintiff acquired in rem or quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion over the Defendants1 property situated in San Juan County 
by virtue of her writ of attachment and it was reversible 
error for the court to find otherwise and to subsequently 
vacate Plaintiff's writ. — 
3. The question raised by Defendants as to the consti-
tutionality of the Utah Attachment Rule is rendered moot by 
the fact that before Plaintiff's writ had issued, Defendants 
had entered a special appearance and had filed a notice of 
hearing and memorandum of authorities, contesting, among other 
things, in rem jurisdiction based on attachment. 
4. Aside from the fact that the question is moot, the 
Utah Attachment Rule is constitutional. - ^o.'^Z'&2& -
:
:~-:"~ •v^i::.•:-••,-• :^*^ .;-r*--- -•:, ARGUMENT •-•• ..;r-'\-eir...yv-^z --^,:-^ r 
By way of reply to Defendants' brief, Plaintiff submits 
the following argument in addition to that contained on pages 
% • 
4 
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15 through 24 of her initial brief on appeal. 
POINT I 
THE PRIOR DECISION IN THE FEDERAL COURT IS NOT RES JUDICATA 
AS TO JURISDICTION. 
Plaintiff agrees that the doctrine of res judicata 
applies to questions involving jurisdiction but submits that 
the same rules also apply, requiring that the precise issue 
be litigated and determined by prior decision before the 
doctrine may be invoked. The issue of in rem or quasi in rem 
jurisdiction based on the amended Rule 64C was not squarely 
presented to and determined by the federal court. 
Defendants grossly misrepresent the nature of the 
present action when they state at page 3 in their brief that 
the "identical case" was originally brought in the Federal 
District Court for Utah and there dismissed for lack of 
personal and in rem jurisdiction. Granted, the action in 
federal court was based on the same incident or occurrence 
as the instant action; however, the whole point of Plaintiff's 
appeal in this case and the reason Plaintiff filed a new 
action in the District Court of San Juan County is that 
subsequent to the filing of the federal action and while the . 
Defendants' appeal from the federal district court was 
pending before the circuit court, this Court amended its Rule 
64C by eliminating the very language which, according to the 
circuit court decision, restricted Utah's Long Arm Statute 
and attachment rule to "personal injury" or "injury to the 
5 
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person." In other words, the amended Rule 64C and its basis 
for in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction was not considered 
or ruled upon by the circuit court, ^ -
Defendants cite the following authorities at pages 7 
and 8 of their brief in support of the proposition that res 
judicata applies to all issues which could have been raised 
in a prior proceeding: Partmar Corp. v. Paramount Pictures 
Theatres Corp., 347 U.S. 89 (1954); 46 AM. JUR. 2d, Judgments, 
Sec. 417 (1969); Burns v. Kepler, 147 Colo. 153, 362 P.2d 
1037, 1039 (1961); Richards v. Hodson, 26 Utah 2d 113, 485 
P.2d 1044 (1971); Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 521 P.2d 379 
(Utah 1974); Wheaton v. Pearson, 14 Utah 2d 45, 376 P.2d 946 
(1962). All of the above cited authorities, however, address 
themselves to the situation where the plaintiff had the 
opportunity of raising and arguing a particular issue or 
theory in the initial action as, for example, in the case of 
Belliston v. Texaco, Inc. where the court found that the 
plaintiff could have raised his state claim along with his 
federal claim when he filed in federal court. 
In the instant case, when Plaintiff filed her initial 
federal action, the amended Rule 64C was non-existent and 
consequently was not within the issues as they were made or 
tendered by the pleadings in that action. The doctrine of 
res judicata does not extend to such non-existent issues of 
l a w . -2r.i';^;:If ?i*j
 :Jx•:;:•• 6. BO-.'-C't?ifc- ¥:&.£€%*, t f e t r - H ; o-£" ' ""* 
Defendants argue on page 5 of their brief that there 
6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
is a split of authority on the question of whether a sub-
sequent change in the law precludes application of res 
judicata in a subsequent case. Plaintiff submits that the 
better reasoned and great weight of authority, as indicated 
in her initial brief, supports the principle that particular-
ly where the change in the law is procedural, the doctrine 
of res judicata will not apply because the question presented 
is an entirely different one than was considered by the prior 
court. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF ACQUIRED IN REM OR QUASI IN REM JURISDICTION OVER 
THE DEFENDANTS" PROPERTY SITUATED IN SAN JUAN COUNTY BY VIRTUE 
OF HER WRIT OF ATTACHMENT AND IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE 
COURT TO FIND OTHERWISE AND TO SUBSEQUENTLY VACATE PLAINTIFF'S 
WRIT. 
Plaintiff reiterates that she claims nothing by way of 
personal jurisdiction over the Defendants as far as the narrow 
issues of this appeal are concerned. 
Defendants strain to make an issue out of the fact that 
the events which gave rise to this cause of action occurred 
in Colorado and that therefore the injury suffered by 
Plaintiff and the decedent's estate in Utah constitutes, by 
some mysterious reasoning, an "undefined, fictional, illusory 
or insubstantial" loss. (Defendants' brief, pages 11 and 14) 
Defendants would have us believe that since Plaintiff lives 
three-quarters of a mile on the Utah side of the Colorado 
7 
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border and since the death occurred barely over the border 
on the Colorado side, somehow that makes Plaintiff's loss 
"fictional, illusory or insubstantial." Plaintiff is hard 
pressed to see any logic in such reasoning. Regardless of 
where the physical act occurred, the real loss and injury 
and therefore the tort arose in Utah where the Plaintiff 
resides and where decedent's estate is. 
Defendants also strain to support their argument that 
Utah does not consider such a loss significant enough to 
provide some means whereby its citizens may redress themselves 
in Utah courts. •••'" zp\~:~.*ry 'y^ #;:^-c.:^  y^. „-;-.,..• ::;--r 
The case of Alpers v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 403 
Pa. 626, 170 A.2d 360 (1961), heavily relied on by Defendants 
to support their argument, is inapplicable here because that 
case was decided on the basis of a 1937 Pennsylvania statute 
which specifically limited writs of attachment on the property 
of non-residents to torts committed within the State of 
Pennsylvania. As pointed out on pages 10-13 in Plaintiff's 
initial brief, the Alpers decision has been severely criticized. 
No such statute exists in Utah. Plaintiff submits that the 
authorities supporting the Alpers view are based on similar 
statutes or case law. 4 
Rule 64C contains no language which limits its applica-
tion to tort acts committed within the state. 
Plaintiff has found no Utah cases, the case of Hydro-
swift Corp. v. Louie's Boats and Motors, 27 Utah 2d 233, 494 
8 
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P.2d 532 (1972), being no exception, that hold that attachment 
is an improper means of obtaining in rem or quasi in rem 
jurisdiction over a non-resident where the events occurred 
in another state• 
The Hydroswift case deals only with the Long Arm 
Statute and has no application to the attachment rule and in 
rem jurisdiction. 
Defendants1 argument that jurisdiction predicated on 
attachment of the property of James C. Wright is improper 
because he has transferred the property to his parents is 
untenable. Plaintiff specifically alleged in her complaint 
(R.2) that subsequent to the shooting, "Defendant James C. 
Wright, without consideration and for the intended purpose 
of avoiding his debts, particularly the obligation owing to 
Plaintiff . . . and thereby defrauding his creditors, 
transferred and conveyed said property to the Defendants 
Clifford Wright and Essie Wright, husband and wife." 
The affidavit submitted by Plaintiff in support of her 
writ of attachment specifically stated that the "Defendant 
James C. Wright has assigned and disposed of real property 
in the State of Utah with intent to defraud his creditors; 
and that unless this attachment issue, said Defendants, and 
each of them, will further attempt to assign and transfer 
real property located in the State of Utah for the purpose 
of avoiding the payment of the obligation herein sued upon, 
and particularly the obligation owing to Plaintiff; that in 
9 
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order to obtain jurisdiction of the matter, it is necessary 
that the Court issue a writ of attachment, retaining and 
holding intact said property for the purpose of satisfying 
in whole or in part any judgment which may be rendered in 
favor of Plaintiff and against the Defendants, or either of 
them." -..5 -—-t -^^l-j^i^^ . r^cfc^a fcr ^ m.ct:. a--::-c:-m-,.' -• ^ -v,-/ .;•; 
It would be improper for the Court to find the attach-
ment improper on the basis of the transfer where Plaintiff's 
claim of fraudulent transfer is one of the issues to be 
litigated in the action. 
That attachment, necessary to secure jurisdiction over 
a non-resident in a state court, is considered a most basic 
and important public interest is obvious from the cases of 
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 32 L.Ed.2d 576 (1972); Ownbey 
v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 65 L.Ed. 837, 41 S.Ct. 433, 17 A.L.R. 
873 (1921); Roscoe v. Butler, 367 F. Supp. 574 (D. My. 1973); 
and United States Industries, Inc. v. Gregg, supra, 348 F. 
Supp. 1022 (D. Del. 1972), discussed under Plaintiff's Point 
IV herein. 
POINT III 
THE QUESTION RAISED BY DEFENDANTS AS TO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY 
OF THE UTAH ATTACHMENT RULE IS RENDERED MOOT BY THE FACT THAT 
BEFORE PLAINTIFF'S WRIT HAD ISSUED, DEFENDANTS HAD ENTERED A 
SPECIAL APPEARANCE AND HAD FILED A NOTICE OF HEARING AND 
MEMORANDUM OF AUTHORITIES, CONTESTING, AMONG OTHER THINGS, IN 
REM JURISDICTION BASED ON ATTACHMENT. :: 
10 l 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Defendants have no room to complain that they were 
denied due process in the attachment procedure followed by 
Plaintiff. 
As Plaintifffs statement of facts discloses, before 
any writ of attachment issued in this case Defendants had 
already appeared specially on January 2, 1975, and again on 
April 22, 1975, and filed their motions to quash service of 
process. On May 1, 1975, before any writ had been issued, 
Defendants had filed their notice of hearing and memorandum 
of authorities wherein, in apparent anticipation that a writ 
of attachment would be issued, they argued that attachment 
is an improper means of conferring in rem jurisdiction. 
The writ of attachment was not issued until May 12, 
1975, two days before the hearing which had been noticed up 
by Defendants wherein oral argument and memoranda of 
authorities were submitted by both sides on the issues, 
including the issue of in rem jurisdiction based on attachment. 
[The property was actually attached by the sheriff on May 13, 
1975, the day before the hearing.] 
Defendants had their day in court concerning the 
attachment the day after their property was attached. 
Plaintiff challenges Defendants to find any authority which 
holds that such a procedure violates due process. The 
question of the constitutionality of the Utah attachment rule 
is therefore moot. 
11 
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POINT IV 
ASIDE FROM THE FACT THAT THE QUESTION IS MOOT, THE UTAH 
ATTACHMENT RULE IS CONSTITUTIONAL. 
In their discussion of the Fuentes case, Defendants 
fail to acknowledge one of the most significant points 
discussed and conclusions reached by that decision, a point 
which has direct bearing on the instant action. 
In Fuentes the United States Supreme Court discussed 
three main criteria in determining the constitutionality of 
replevin statutes: (1) the existence of an Important 
Governmental or General Public Interest; (2) the need for 
prompt action and (3) the State's maintenance of strict 
control over its monopoly of legitimate force. 
The Fuentes court found that in most cases outright 
seizure of property must be preceded by a prior hearing; 
however, it specifically noted as follows: 
In three cases, the Court has allowed the attachment 
of property without a prior hearing. . . . Another 
case involved attachment necessary to secure jurisdic-
tion in state court—clearly a most basic and important 
public interest. Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 US 94, 65 L.Ed. 
837, 41 S.Ct. 433, 17 ALR 873. (Emphasis added) 32 
L.Ed.2d at 576, n.[29] 
The Ownbey case, supra, cited by the court in Fuentes 
contains some significant language concerning the historical 
use of attachment to obtain jurisdiction over a non-resident; 
Our circumstances as a nation have tended peculiarly 
to give importance to a remedy of this character. The 
division of our extended domain into many different 
states, each limitedly sovereign within its territory, 
inhabited by a people enjoying unrestrained privilege 
of transit from place to place in each state, and from 
12 
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state to state; taken in connection with the universal 
and unexampled expansion of credit, and the prevalent 
abolishment of imprisonment for debt, would naturally, 
and of necessity, lead to the establishment, and, as 
experience has demonstrated, the enlargement and 
extension, of remedies acting upon the property of 
debtors. 65 L.Ed, at 843. 
But a property owner who absents himself from the 
territorial jurisdiction of a state, leaving his 
property within it, must be deemed ex necessitate to 
consent that the state may subject such property to 
judicial process to answer demands made against him 
in his absence, according to any practicable method 
that reasonably may be adopted. A procedure customarily 
employed, long before the Revolution, in the commercial 
metropolis of England, and generally adopted by the 
states as suited to their circumstances and needs, 
cannot be deemed inconsistent with due process of law, 
even if it be taken with its ancient incident of 
requiring security from a defendant who, after seizure 
of his property, comes within the jurisdiction and 
seeks to interpose a defense. The condition imposed 
has a reasonable relation to the conversion of a 
proceeding quasi in rem into an action in personam; 
ordinarily it is not difficult to comply with—a man 
who has property usually has friends and credit—and 
hence in its normal operation it must be regarded as 
a permissible condition. (Emphasis added) 65 L.Ed. 
837 at 846 (1921) 
The court in Ownbey further noted that legislation 
providing for proceedings by attachment against non-residents, 
as well as against absconding debtors, was passed by the 
assembly of Delaware counties and the province of Pennsylvania 
as early as March 24, 1770. 
Defendants cite the case of Roscoe v. Butler, 367 F. 
Supp. 574 (D. My. 1973), in support of their argument that 
attachment used as a means of obtaining in rem jurisdiction 
is unconstitutional. That case, however, specifically cited 
the Ownbey, supra, and Fuentes, supra, cases discussed above 
and made it clear that the attachment procedure as a means of 
13 
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acquiring in rem jurisdiction over a non-resident comes within 
the exception allowed in Fuentes. Of particular importance 
is the court's discussion of the question regarding how 
"necessary" the attachment had to be to secure jurisdiction: 
In Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 41 S.Ct. 433, 65 ^ 
L.Ed. 837 (1921) , quasi in rem jurisdiction was 
exercised by a Delaware court when a non-resident 
plaintiff attached the shares of stock of a Delaware 
corporation belonging to a non-resident defendant. 
Although the consistency of the summary attachment 
with due process was not addressed by the supreme 
court, the present court in Fuentes approved of the 
use of quasi in rem jurisdiction in Ownbey because it 
involved "attachment necessary to secure jurisdiction 
in state court—clearly a most basic and important 
public interest." 407 U.S. at 91, n.23, 92 S.Ct. at 
199. The court, however, failed to define with 
sufficient specificity how "necessary" the attachment 
had to be in securing jurisdiction. This omission has 
prompted considerable controversy among courts and 
commentators. On one hand, the majority of courts 
considering the issue have implicitly found "necessity" 
merely from the fact that the defendant was a non-
resident and presumably not amenable to personal 
service. See, e.g. United States Industries, Inc. v. 
Gregg, supra, 348 F. Supp. at 1021; Schneider v. 
Margossian, 349 F. Supp. 741, 744 (D. Mass. 1972). 
On the other hand, commentators have argued that 
"necessary" means the only way in which the state 
could have obtained jurisdiction in the case. Thus 
if an alternative procedure, such as a long arm statute, 
would provide in personam jurisdiction, summary 
attachment via quasi m rem action would not satisfy 
the due process clause. (Emphasis added) 367 F. Supp 
at 579 
In the Roscoe case the court found that the return of 
summonses twice non est is ample evidence that in personam 
jurisdiction is not availablef and consequently the only way 
in which a state can assert its jurisdiction over the 
defendant is by use of a quasi in rem action. In other words, 
said the court, since the resident debtor's appearance cannot 
14 
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be obtained through the usual service of process procedures, 
he is in the same position vis-a-vis state jurisdictional 
authority as a non-resident. The court concluded that the 
Maryland attachment rule served a valid public interest 
within the meaning of Fuentes. 
It is significant that the facts of the instant case 
satisfy both of the requirements of "necessity" discussed 
above by the Roscoe decision. In this case the Defendants 
are non-residents and not amenable to service of process and 
the circuit court has held that the Utah Long Arm Statute 
cannot be used to obtain jurisdiction. The circuit court's 
decision may not be binding on this Court as to the law 
regarding the long arm statute, but it may be binding on this 
case as far as res judicata is concerned. In any event, the 
requirement of "necessity" for in rem jurisdiction in this 
case is clearly satisfied. 
The second test laid down in Fuentes is that of prompt 
action. Plaintiff submits that there is sufficient reason 
for prompt action where the Defendant James C. Wright has 
transferred his property to Defendants Clifford and Essie 
Wright in an attempt to avoid jurisdiction of the Court and 
where Plaintiff has cause to believe that Defendants may 
further transfer or dispose of the property so as to avoid 
jurisdiction and the obligation to Plaintiff. 
The third criterion discussed in Fuentes is the state's 
maintenance of strict control over its monopoly of legitimate 
15 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
force. The court in that case did not specify the controls 
that would be required in all cases. It merely found, as 
follows, that the Florida and Pennsylvania statutes abdicate 
effective state control over state power: 
Private parties, serving their own private advantage, 
may unilaterally invoke state power to replevy goods 
from another. No state official participates in the 
decision to seek a writ; no state official reviews 
the basis for the claim to repossession; and no state 
official evaluates the need for immediate seizure. 
There is not even a requirement that the plaintiff 
provide any information to the court on these matters. 
The state acts largely in the dark. 32 L.Ed.2d 556 at 
577. 
By contrast to the Florida and Pennsylvania statutes, 
the Utah Attachment Rule imposes the following controls: 
(1) The plaintiff must submit an affidavit, after 
filing a complaint, setting forth the following: (a) that 
the defendant is indebted to the plaintiff, specifying the 
amount thereof and the nature of the indebtedness; (b) that 
the attachment is not sought to hinder, delay or defraud any 
creditor of the defendant; (c) that the payment of the same 
has not been secured by any mortgage or lien upon real or 
personal property situate or being in this state and alleging, 
but not in the alternative, one of seven listed causes for 
attachment (two of which are here relevant): (i) that the 
defendant is not a resident of this state and (ii) such other 
additional facts showing probable cause for being and that 
plaintiff is justly apprehensive of losing his claim unless 
a writ of attachment issue. 
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(2) An official of the state then issues the writ of 
attachment upon the filing by the plaintiff of the required 
affidavit, together with an undertaking on the part of the 
plaintiff, with sufficient sureties, in a sum of not less 
than double the amount claimed by the plaintiff. The 
conditions of the undertaking are such that if the defendant 
recovers judgment or if the attachment is wrongfully issued, 
the plaintiff will pay all costs that may be awarded to the 
defendant and all damages which he may sustain by reason of 
the attachment. 
(3) There is also a provision in 64C(4) for a post 
attachment hearing where the defendant may at any time, upon 
such notice to the plaintiff as the court may require, make 
a motion to the court in which the action is pending to have 
the writ of attachment discharged on the ground that the same 
was improperly or irregularly issued. 
Plaintiff submits that the above procedures and controls 
required by Rule 6 4C are more than sufficient to meet the 
standards imposed by Fuentes and the other authorities cited 
by Defendants. Defendants' argument that the Utah rule is 
unconstitutional because it provides for no post attachment 
hearing is without merit in view of the above discussion. 
The case of U.S. Industries, Inc. v. Gregg, supra, 
involves attachment used to obtain in rem jurisdiction over 
a non-resident's property. In that case the court held as 
follows: 
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The Supreme Court's footnote characterization of the 
attachment in the Ownbey case supplies the answer to 
the initial inquiry of whether the seizure was "directly 
necessary to secure an important governmental or general 
public interest." This is not a case like Fuentes 
where the statutes allowed "summary seizure" when "no 
more than [a] private gain is directly at stake." 
Fuentes v. Shevin, supra at 93, 92 S.Ct. at 2000. As 
previously noted a state has a legitimate interest in 
the exercise of judicial jurisdiction with respect to 
property within its borders. Seizure for the purpose 
of securing such jurisdiction in a state court, 
accordingly, serves, in the words of the Supreme Court, 
"a most basic and important public interest." (Emphasis 
added) 348 F. Supp. 1004 at 1021 
Here, unlike Fuentes, the order effecting the seizure 
:
 was issued by a state court judge. That judge had been 
supplied with a complaint and with an affidavit which 
revealed: (1) that Gregg was a non-resident and according-
ly not subject to the in personam jurisdiction of the 
court, (2) that Gregg owned specifically described, 
alienable property within the State of Delaware, (3) 
the value of that property and (4) the source of the 
plaintiffs1 information on these subjects. This 
information provided the basis for a determination 
that the seizure would be in furtherance of the 
"important public interest" underlying the sequestration -
statute and that prompt action would be required. 348 
F. Supp at 1022 
Plaintiff submits that the Utah Attachment Rule and 
the procedure followed in the present action comply with all 
of the standards enumerated by the Supreme Court in Fuentes 
and that Rule 64C is therefore constitutional. 
"•"•'" CONCLUSION 
Defendants' argument that res judicata applies is 
without merit for t M following reasons: 
/•'•'•• 1. The question of in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction 
based on the amended Rule 6 4C was never considered by the 
circuit court and was not within the issues as they were 
tendered in the pleadings to that court because Rule 64C in 
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its amended form was non-existent at the time Plaintiff filed 
her action and at the time Defendants took their appeal. 
2. A subsequent change in a procedural rule precludes 
the application of the doctrine of res judicata. 
Defendants' argument that the lower court was without 
in rem jurisdiction based on Plaintiff's writ of attachment 
must be rejected for the following reasons: 
1. There is no statutory or judicial authority in Utah 
which precludes the use of attachment as a means of obtaining 
in rem jurisdiction over the Defendants' property where the 
events from which the cause of action arose occurred in 
another state and where the injury and loss is sustained by 
the Plaintiff residing in Utah. 
2. This Court has recognized the use of attachment as 
a means of obtaining in rem jurisdiction over the property of 
a non-resident. [Plaintiff's initial brief, p.13, et seq.] 
3. The United States Supreme Court has recognized 
attachment as a necessary means of securing jurisdiction in 
state court and a most basic and important public interest. 
(Plaintiff-Appellant's reply brief, Point IV) 
Defendants' constitutional challenge is moot because 
they were afforded ample due process by the procedures 
followed as discussed in Plaintiff's Point III herein. In 
any event, the Utah Attachment Rule is constitutional for the 
reasons discussed under Plaintiff's Point IV herein. 
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